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Species vs. Genus in the Romantic Novel:
Warren's World Enough and Time
Robert Siegle

Though at first glance a reasonable enough label, the term
"romantic novel" becomes increasingly contradictory the more
one examines it. The two halves of the term draw upon opposed
connotations and hence seem more like contraries than the
orderly relation of species to genus implied in the term. Typically,
the history of the novel is thought to begin with the emergence of
"formal realism," 1 and a concern for the "details" and "particulars"
of experience is assumed to be its "generic comrnitment." 2 On the
other hand, the word "romantic" connotes a greater emphasis
upon the imaginative than the rational, the subjective rather than
the objective. Indeed, in the most extended treatment of the
romantic novel, Robert Kiely characterizes the form as a
"battleground." As he puts it, "theories, techniques of craft, and
moral imperatives related to the cultivation of imagination and the
supremacy of the self collided with those associated with reason
and public welfare." 3
Such a collision is familiar to students of American literature,
particularly since Richard Chase's classic discussion of romance
and realism. He describes romance as being dominant in
American fiction and as eschewing the "ordinary novelistic
requirements of verisimilitude, development, and continuity" in
order "to plunge into the underside of consciousness" rather than
remain in the daylight world of "the spectacle of man in society." 4
The combination of these two elements in the romantic novel thus
gives us the conflict between the "novelistic requirements" of
realism and "the cultivation of imagination and the supremacy of
the self." To this conceptual tension, however, we must add an
equivalent formal strain, for, as Kiely observes, "in nearly every
case one has a sense of unresolved struggle, of intelligence and
energy at odds." 5 In defining the "dynamic antagonism" released
in the best examples of the romantic novel, Kiely notes that
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although romantic novels do have structural patterns,
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character types, and situations in common, their primary
tendency is to destroy (or, at the very least, undermine)
particular narrative conventions. Romantic novels thrive like
parasites on structures whose ruin is the source of their life."
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The romantic novel is thus a doubly divided form fighting both a
civil war among its conflicting romantic and realistic ideologies,
and something like a war of colonial liberation against the ruling
narrative conventions with which Kiely finds it colliding.
That such conflicts can create enduring critical problems is
evident in the responses one finds to a work like Wuthering
Heights . One hardly knows whether the first generation of
characters are human or are scarcely definable elemental forces,
while the second generation appear to be faint parodies of their
seniors. Where in the range suggested between elemental forces
and socialized beings does the self lie? Or consider Poe's The
Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym and its proliferation of symbolic
possibilities at the end, all dashing to incoherent destruction
along with the perhaps enlightened protagonist, lost in the
cataract at the feet of a great white figure which remains
conceptually stranded between the realism of the genus and the
romance of the species.
Moreover, as one thinks through various examples of the
romantic novel, one finds these formal and conceptual tensions
taking repeatedly the form of a single issue: the grounds of
selfhood. These grounds may be located within, as in the all but
mystical metaphysical sense of identity implied in Wuthering
Heights; they may be located in Sir Walter Scott's middle ground
whereon the protagonist negotiates his way among conflicting
social orders; they may be located in Poe's search to relate the self
to an ultimate cosmic principle. But however the romantic novelist
mediates among these contending grounds of selfhood, his
narrative resolution is complicated both thematically and
technically by his conflicting allegiances to both genus and
species. Whether the protagonist heeds an inner light, fulfills the
duties assigned him by society, or subordinates himself to a
higher or ultimate being, he is defined through the conflicts
inherent in the romantic novel.
Though one may identify a number of fruitful suggestions
towards a perspective on this perplexing form, possibly the most
penetrating study is found in a novel of our own century, Robert
47
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Penn Warren's World Enough and Time (1950). The passage of both
literary and nonliterary history since the classic nineteenthcentury exemplars introduces some ironic distance into this text,
suggesting that Warren's subtitle, "A Romantic Novel," may be
more an allusion than an identification, in effect quoting the
tradition but with a critical difference. Nonetheless, the narrative
works closely with the antinomies in this species of the novel.
Indeed, Robert B. Heilman's extraordinary review of World Enough
and Time when it first appeared clearly expresses Warren's version
of the basic tension we have outlined; he describes the novel as
charting
the failure of a private, subjective "ideal" realm to come to
terms with, to be integrated with, to be married to a realm of
public life and activity, the realm of politics and society and
group action, of law and justice. 7
Most critics follow in Heilman's wake, accepting as a satisfactory
summary of the novel's theme the division made by its
protagonist, Jeremiah Beaumont, between the "Idea" and the
"World." 8 However, the work's narrative complexity and figurative
variations on this theme suggest that Warren's allusion is more a
troubled inquiry into the relationships between conceptual and
formal antinomies than a simple reiteration of them. Indeed, the
"unresolved struggle" Kiely finds throughout the romantic novel
is foregrounded here in a way that challenges the assumptions of
both its tributaries. Not only do we have a dark version of the
American Adam trying to narrate a justification of his life, but we
also have a modem historian looking over his shoulder, as it were,
trying to make sense of both Jeremiah's act of interpretation and
that which he anticipates on the part of the reader. Would-be
swashbuckler and scholarly historian, the diary of selfhood and
the study of social facts - the contraries come to the surface in
anything but a peaceful integration or marriage, to recur to
Heilman's metaphors. 9 Ultimately the novel plays off these
contraries to redefine them in ways less naive metaphysically than
the precedents to which it responds.
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The narrator introduces almost immediately the concerns we
have located in the nature of the romantic novel. As he is an
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historian, one would anticipate his allegiance to realism, and
indeed his method in general is to get the reader as close as
possible to the "historical facts" of the case. 10 But he is a romantic
sort of historian, much given to emotional relations with his
characters and, more importantly, to figurative language that
often introduces into his objective and realistic account the
romantic novel's imaginative disruption of such forms. In the
novel's second paragraph, for example, he muses over the project
ahead of him in terms that bear directly on the problems at hand:
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We have what is left, the lies and half-lies and the truths and
half-truths. We do not know that we have the Truth. But we
must have it. 11
These sentences represent a conventional gesture towards the
necessary element of uncertainty as one comes to grips with
historical materials like Beaumont's journal. By pluralizing and
halving truths and lies, he accounts rigorously for the relativities
and uncertainties plaguing the struggle to set right the record.
But other tendencies of this historian also show here, for not only
does he capitalize Truth as an absolute, but he visibly hungers for
it.
That is, if Truth is his goal, then his difficulty in achieving it is a
question of the integrity of witnesses, the abilities of the
historian, and other such empirical limitations- Truth is there, it
would seem, but simply a problem to reach. Such an expectation
is basic to both romance and realism, though they work for it in
different ways, but the assumption separates our narrator from
the modern professional historian who has no naive belief that his
venture is other than interpretation. This narrator, however, tells
us that "we must have it." What he means by this phrase is
ambiguous, and that ambiguity becomes increasingly significant
as the novel proceeds and the "facts" become more difficult to
ascertain. Does he mean "must" in the sense that we necessarily
have it in the documents themselves (it must be there)? If so, he is
a true believer in the word of the primary text (Beaumont's
journal) and the most naive and credulous of historians, one who
takes the realistic element of the "romantic novel" to its furthest
conceptual extreme. Perhaps, however, "must" connotes the
desperate desire to hold Truth absolute and pure (I must have
certainty!); the very desperation here imperils the historian's
49
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objectivity and realism, for it parallels Jeremiah's ultimately
unscrupulous pursuit of the Idea. Or, finally, does "must" refer
not to the desire to have truth at any cost, but rather to a kind of
ontological necessity to have truth as a condition of survival (as
one must have food and water)? If so, we have moved to the very
extremity of the romantic preoccupation with an ultimate nature
of man and cosmos, knowable by means of the imagination, a
pole of certainty as absolute as that of the documentary realist of
the first of these three readings, but which emphasizes the
subjective process rather than the objective record of facts.
This spread of contrary potentials in the passage repeats that
division of loyalties we have found at the heart of this genre, and
it is confirmed repeatedly as one moves on through the text. The
next sentences of this same paragraph, for example, give us two
quite crucial metaphors for the whole venture on which the
narrator is embarking, metaphors which in fact present
considerable difficulties to any effort to take them as a simple
form of signification . The narrator continues:
Puzzling over what is left, we are like the scientist fumbling
with a tooth and thigh bone to reconstruct for a museum
some great, stupid beast extinct with the ice age. Or we are
like the louse-bit nomad who finds, in a fold of land between
his desert and the mountains, the ruin of parapets and
courts, and marvels what kind of men had held the world
before him. But at least we have the record: the tooth and
thigh bone, or the kingly ruins. (3)
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To be "puzzling" over remnants may well be the human
condition, but the two metaphors develop quite different contexts
for this state. The first comparison, between the historian and the
scientist, allies the historian with the equally scholarly and
objective researcher in the world of hard, measurable facts . The
analogy is not, however, without ambiguities, for this scientist is
"fumbling," and he must "reconstruct" a dinosaur from only a
tooth and a thigh bone; however well-intentioned he is, however
thorough his preparation, a great deal of imagination and many
hypotheses are going to be needed in his task. And even the
value of that task is questioned, for its object, Jeremiah, is hardly
enhanced by the comparison to a "great, stupid beast," for while
"great" indeed suggests the scope to which he aspired, "stupid" is
50
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anything but ennobling. Moreover, to be "extinct" and destined
only for a museum indicates a failure to have achieved the sort of
timeless ideal that would make his search of enduring value.
The second metaphor we have for this narrator's relation to his
material reverses the terms absolutely. Instead of the
contemporary scientific culture-hero, we have a "louse-bit
nomad" whose "fumbling" results from purposeless wandering
rather than attempting the scholarly challenge faced by the
paleontologist. Dweller in the fruitless desert, he is dumbfounded
by the "marvels" of civilized refinement whose traces he discovers
by sheer accident rather than by the meticulous dental-picking of
the archaeologist. Rather than a "stupid" and "extinct" beast, his
quarry is a master race dwarfing the present, romantic heroes of a
lost golden age towering above the squat shapes of a degenerate
age. The first image draws us to the superior position occupied by
the quintessential novelist, the omniscient narrator, who surveys
with wit and wisdom the expanse of the fictional world and
reconstructs it for the textual museum. The second, however,
introduces the romantic elements this commentary upon it has
suggested, and places us at the lowest point of entry in a quest for
what Kiely termed "the cultivation of imagination and the
supremacy of the self," a quest whose fulfillment is embodied in
that mysterious "kind of men [who] had held the world before"
this conceptually nomadic narrator undertook his task. By the
first image, Jeremiah's fate is the logical consequence of
attempting to enact a romantic ideology in a world that runs on
realism; by the second, however, he is the last of those who had
the greatness of spirit and vision to attempt the great role. Both
Jererniahs are present in the novel, just as both narrators are, and
in the strain between their sets of assumptions one finds that
curiously destructive, parasitical quality Kiely argues as basic to
the romantic novel. 12
One result of this strain is that the narrator cannot rely fully
upon either outlook as a basis for his judgments about Jeremiah's
journal. Certainly he lacks the authority presumed by an
omniscient novelist, but he also is diffident about deciding which
of several possible readings of his sources is "right." Perhaps his
interest in these ambiguities is part of his romantic focus upon the
glimpses into subjectivity such passages permit. If so, he does not
seem ultimately to reach any sure sense of a consciousness (his
own or Jeremiah's) that would ground his interpretations and
51
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make all the manifestations of that consciousness cohere. At one
point, for example, he notes Jeremiah's stylistic preference for
"terms of horror and condemnation" in his journal,
as though he would cloak himself in the language of common
report. Or did his motive lie deeper? Did that language
cleanse his hands for the moment, and restore him to the
society of men? Or when his own tongue condemned his act,
did he relish the irony because at that moment he felt more
free and secret in his inner self set off from the world? (248)
This trifurcating explanation points to different ways of thinking
about the implications of Jeremiah's style. The first reading (cliche
as cloak) suggests that an authentic self is lost through immersion
in the language of everyday gossip. The second, by contrast,
reverses this valorization of individualism and prizes the place in
the community he may have regained by seeing himself through
their language rather than through his own. One explanation
notes a lapse from a romantic drive to selfhood, the other an
attempt to enter the community of realistic assumptions about
actions and their values. The third, however, is a puzzle from
either perspective. That is, the romantic "supremacy of self" Kiely
mentions has become a more than Byronic version of the
protagonist cut off from the norm by both egoism and crime. At
the same time, the normal distance implied by realistic objectivity
is grotesquely exaggerated; Jeremiah's "irony" opens so cold and
so extreme a space between his expression and both his "inner
self" and "the world" that any sense of moral relation, either to his
own actions or to the community, seems lost somewhere in the
act of verbal play. It is as if each of the two views had been taken
so far as to meet its contrary in a diabolic inversion of the
harmonies which Jeremiah sought in his life, and the narrator in
his presentation of those materials. It may well be appropriate that
the inversion should be signalled by irony, the means by which
language tries to escape its limits by signalling an awareness of
the distance between sign and referent. That is, the irony is
"appropriate" in view of the manner in which romantic novels, as
Kiely points out, "thrive like parasites on structures whose ruin is
the source of their life." Here, the nature of the "ruin" is the
mutually destructive criticism the "romantic" and the "novel"
wage against each other's extreme form - exposing the solipsism
52
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and anti-social irresponsibility of the romantic mode, and the
sterility and self-alienation of the realistic. Moreover, it is a "ruin"
evident not only in the unmistakable failures of Jeremiah's life,
but also in the narrator's response of uncertainty to the key
elements of both Jeremiah's life and his diary. Far from
synthesizing these elements harmoniously, the narrator finds that
the harder he tries to specify, the more clearly the strain between
them shows.
Another example indicates that this is not a confusion unique to
Jeremiah's case. After Rachel's long-delayed confession of love to
Jeremiah, the narrator asks,
Had she spoken them [words of love] out of her own guilt as
an expiation? Or out of pity for the very loneliness which
made him reject her? Or had she spoken the truth when she
said that she loved him because love was the only thing left,
and you must have something, even to die? Or because the
unwritten text of the drama that she and Jeremiah Beaumont
acted out on their high and secret stage demanded this in the
end? (377)
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Though at first glance these questions seem to be the objective
historian's neutral list of possible motives, they actually propose
four quite different conceptions of self and cosmos jostling for
dominance in the narrator's mind. Rachel as a repentant sinner
implies the universe of moral struggle; as an exquisite sensibility
moved by pity, she is the pathetic heroine in a cosmic melodrama;
as a desperate wretch under capital sentence, she is a naturalist
victim ~ound down to the last emotion in her repertoire; as a role
player, she is a slightly ludicrous stand-in for herself in a fabulist
heroic drama. We move, in other words, in a romantic framework
from a drama of moral absolutes to its degenerate form of
sentimental drama, and in a realist framework from an austere
awareness of the individual crushed by social forces beyond her
control to its satirical form unveiling the private delusions that
account for deviant or foolish behavior. None of these literary
zones joined in the romantic novel is a resting point, however,
because they all coexist within the conceptual tensions of the
form. The coexistence of incompatible elements produces the sort
of "dynamic antagonism" of which Kiely warned us, and accounts
for the narrator's uncertainty as he juggles these different
53
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conceptual structures for organizing his interpretation and
presentation of the material. At the junction of two cultural
traditions, the narrator is almost paralyzed by the surplus of
frameworks available to him.
At a few points in the narrative, he rises to something like an
awareness of this dilemma, however, and tries to pass beyond the
structural limits of the romantic novel. In trying to think beyond
the ruin of these structures, his comments fulfill Kiely's other
prediction about the genre's hostility to the forms and premises of
tradition. For example, in an effort to preempt a too easy
condescension to Jeremiah on the part of his readers, the narrator
pauses about a quarter of the way into the novel, with
implications that escape the local context:
The gratuitous act: that was what he sought. But why did he
seek it, the act outside the motives of the world? The answer
is easy. It was the only way he knew to define himself, to
create his world. We look back on his story, so confused and
comic and pretentious and sad, and it seems very strange to
us, for our every effort is to live in the world, to accept its
explanations, to do nothing gratuitously. But is his story so
strange? Explanations can only explain explanations, and the
self is gratuitous in the end. (116)
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The first third of the comment seems pure Romanticism- the
supreme self developing itself through the supra-rational
discourse of the imagination, a self-authenticating, selfgrounding, self-creating plenitude of being. The middle sentence
pictures us all by contrast as pure realists living in the world of
straightforward explanations. The comment closes like a steel
vise, however, crushing the two alternatives together until they
are as flat as the page that gives rise to them. If "explanations can
only explain explanations," then the discourse of either romance
or realism embodies something like an intertextual circularity: the
explanations cannot reach outside the text to the referent, to the
self or the world they are about, rather than simply are. And if the
self is "gratuitous," then the two meanings of that adjective
become central for us. If the self is "unearned," like a gratuitous
payment, then the romantic emphasis upon cultivating selfhood is
unnecessary: the self is already there, paid out to the individual
independent of his strivings, an act of ontological grace. If, at the
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same time, the self is unjustified, like gratuitous criticism, then it
cannot manifest the clear relations of cause and effect between
essence and actions. The realist project of representing details and
particulars in order to illustrate their implicit rationale becomes
the imposition of an organic fiction upon chance contiguities.
Is this a thinking beyond the impasse of the conflicting
structures within the form of the romantic novel, or is it simply a
moment of despair or near inarticulateness on the part of the
narrator? One indication that World Enough and Time ventures a
step beyond the two traditions on which it draws is the narrator's
reflection upon a crucial moment in Jeremiah's journal. The
protagonist comes to the point at which he feels "a numbness and
the knowledge without even despair that my life was nothing and
all I had ever done was nothing and meant nothing." The narrator
comments at length:

er
He had come to the "knowledge," he says. He says that, but
we can scarcely believe him, for if he had come truly to the
knowledge, would he have sat again the next day at his table
and written down the account of all that Munn Short had
said, and all that he himself had said, and the horror of his
nightmare? With that knowledge what could have been the
meaning of that act of recording? But he did write it, and the
words are all there before us on the yellowing, curling sheets.
Or is there the paradox that even in that knowledge, even
when it is truly had, man must put down the words, must
make the record? For even when that knowledge of blankness
comes, he is still man and must "justify"? (392-3)
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For the romantic character, there could have been no "meaning of
that act of recording," and for the realist narrator, there is no
plausibility in Jeremiah's making the attempt. For the narrator
striving to think beyond the impasse, however, there is the
paradox of the alternative we have just explored - that man is a
textual creature, and "must make the record" even if what he has
is a "knowledge of blankness." There may only be the passion of
recording, of "justifying" not in the sense of invoking
transcendent or scientific laws explaining the ways of God and
man, but of "justifying" the typographical margins of a life whose
"selfhood" falls now between the quotation marks from opposing
traditions (romaticism and realism), a textual creation of the
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interpreter- in first person, as in Jeremiah's journal, or in third,
as in the novel at hand. Blankness, the absence of words or of
what those words attempt to embody, may be the kind of
knowledge to which Colonel Fort, the novel's other "hero,"
comes: "There is no sadness like the sadness of a man who knows
the secrets of the world and of power, for only that man is forced
to face the blankness of the last secret," the secret of "the man
himself" (36-37).
The narrator's speculations take us significantly beyond the
heartening synthesis of romanticism and realism we might have
expected from this hybrid genre, and in the "dynamic
antagonism" and anti-conventional rebelliousness of its nature
take "man," of whom we would expect an enriched definition,
and all but lose him amidst the mutual criticism of its polar
elements.
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We ought not neglect entirely the working out of this dilemma
in the life and narrative of Jeremiah Beaumont, for they confirm
the implicit critique of literary traditions we find in the narrator's
commentary. Perhaps indicative of his general state of mind is his
reaction to the pledge his lawyer, Mr. Madison, makes his wife:
"Beaumont will never hang."
The

Beaumont will never hang, the words tingled in Jeremiah's
mind, as he watched Mr. Madison ascend the ladder and
disappear. Beaumont will never hang, Beaumont will never hang,
like the refrain of a ballad or old song forgotten from some
desperate violence of long ago, the identity of the hero lost.
He released Rachel horn his embrace, and stepped from
her side. He took a few paces, and stopped, hearing the
words in his head.
But I am Beaumont, he thought.
Then, I am Beaumont, and I will never hang. (362)
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Jeremiah is disoriented, strangely lost to himself, until he has the
traditional form of the ballad to give him a sense of structure, and
to enable him to identify himself with "the hero" long ago in
romance's golden age. The last two lines set out a defective logic
of identity by which he fills the slot in the heroic ballad with his
own future. But that identity, the text says, is "lost," just as
56
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Jeremiah's is to himself. Any possibility of a direct sense of
himself is displaced by the mediating textual frameworks from
which he derives his self-conception.
At first, Jeremiah has absolute conviction in these textually
based identities, as in his feeling "that the future was beyond
plan, it already existed, he w:ould discover it step by step as he
moved toward some 'flame, some point of light, beyond the murk
and mist of things" (62). That his self is the very light of truth,
pre-existent and only temporarily obscured by the "murk and
mist" of daily existence, is as extreme a form of romantic certitude
as one could imagine. Bit by bit, this conviction is chipped away.
In one of the earliest passages in which he questions the grounds
of his beliefs, he introduces the metaphor of gambling:
And I asked myself how may we know that Justice is in the
heart? There is no one to tell us. It is like a game, I said to
myself, in which we place our coin upon a card, then tum the
card to see if we win or lose, if on it or no is truly pictured
the kingly face of Justice.
Ah, but- and I put the last sad query to myself- can we
ever see the other side of the card? Who will tell us?
(122-3)

is

The plaintive tone of the final question shows how keenly
Jeremiah feels this version of the epistemological dilemma: the
face of truth is forever turned from us, and there is no one to "tell
us" if indeed we are right.
The harder Jeremiah tries to overcome this dilemma, to wed the
romantic search for selfhood with the realistic account of man in
society, the closer he comes to a sense of the final failure of either
effort. Jeremiah scribbles his later journal entries during an
abortive return to nature that brings him closer to bestiality than
to anything remotely resembling natural innocence. The narrator
half summarizes, half quotes the insights Jeremiah reached
struggling to come to terms with his destiny:
But he came to know how hard it was "to know the
inwardness and truth of things, for a man remembers what
was the fact, but even as he remembers he knows the fact to
be a fleeting shadow of something that passed, as when he
looks at the ground and sees the swift shadow of a bird's
57
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flight and lifts his eyes, but the hawk, or whatever bird it was
that had swooped thus low, is gone." The truth would justify,
for "if we can truly know the truth we know that it could
never have been otherwise, and what we know to be true we
can accept, for that is all the heart yearns for in the end." But
it was hard to know. (379-80)
That unambiguous beacon of the true self has now become what
the heart can only yearn for. It would both "justify" one's life and
enable one to "accept" one's lot, but as Jeremiah nears the end of
his narrative line, he realizes this revelation is "hard to know,"
even impossible. For his image of the hawk shows how
thoroughly Jeremiah has come to share the narrator's insight
about "explanations." Even facts, the cornerstone of realism, are
interpretations- they are but a "fleeting shadow of something
that has passed" into the shadow of language. Far from knowing
"whatever bird" he is, Jeremiah has at best only the shadow of a
flight, trace rather than face.
Moreover, the problem may be even more difficult than the
effort to embody a metaphysical selfhood in the medium of
language. Near the middle of the novel Jeremiah recalls the image
of that point of light, but with a significant difference:
And I thought how my own words had sprung from
something in me I did not know the name or meaning for,
and how a man moves in the darkness of himself, more
trackless than the wild country, toward a light which
glimmers far away. But he does not know what the light may
be. (And now that all has come to pass, do I know?) (172)
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Both name and meaning disappear for Jeremiah as the self that
was to be a beacon beyond time and space has become a mystery
which "glimmers far away" in the "trackless" region that
knowledge cannot reach. But what if the "something in me" from
which these words spring is not the unified spiritual unity
Jeremiah seeks, but the internalized beliefs of the culture outside
him? What if "he" is blankness, as the narrator suggests, and his
"words" are always only the world's? He comes close to grasping
this possibility after overhearing gossip suggesting that he
married for security. Shaken and shamed, Jeremiah observes in
his journal that
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If a man lives by what he feels to be the truth in him, and
discovers in a single instant that the tongue of the world says
differently of him, there comes the fear and shame that what
he had held to be the truth in him may not be the truth after
all and there may be no truth for him but the terrible truth
now given him by the tongue of the world. And if a man is
robbed of his truth, and of a sudden, how can he know what
he is? (164)
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The six occurrences of "tongue" in this passage keep the truth of
selfhood linguistic and hence, as Jeremiah feels, relative to the
cultural consensus ("the tongue of the world") rather than to a
metaphysical"truth in him."
Jeremiah appears at such a moment on the verge of seeing how
completely the existence of selfhood, not to mention our concept
of it, depends upon the way men speak of it. He has learned the
discourse of realism from Colonel Fort and that of romanticism
from his philosophy and his novels, but finds himself all but lost
between their conflicting conventions. It is thus with nostalgia
that he speaks at the very end of "a way I have missed," "a way
whereby the word becomes flesh . . . [and] the flesh becomes
word." Such a union would appear to be the ultimate aim of the
romantic novel, but this narrative suggests that one cannot help
but miss a way that is less a union than the split identity of a
fictional subgenre and, ultimately perhaps, of a culture.

World Enough and Time thus appears to offer a surprising
response to the "unresolved struggle" of the traditional romantic
novel: the very project draws together two fundamental traditions
in our culture in a way that frustrates both, causing them to
publish the improbabilities of each other's assumptions. Karl
Kroeber's conclusions in Romantic Narrative Art give us a point of
perspective upon the generic issue. Basic to romantic narrative, he
argues, is "the experience of an individual's journey through past
errors and present confusions to a private intuition of universal
harmony." 13 This intuition, clearly, is Jeremiah's goal, but certainly
not his achievement. For framing his effort is that of a modern
historian to represent, and thus to explain, a life gone wrong.
This narrator seems to view the gap between Jeremiah's reach and
grasp as an inevitable one, and though he shares with his subject
59
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some nostalgia for the goals of romance, he nonetheless draws
out Jeremiah's own increasing doubts about its basic assumptions
and adds to them his own. As we have seen, however, his
realistic framework also suffers wear from these experiences, and
we have not a simple reversal of romance to realism, but a
recognition that they are only alternative explanations which fail
to comprehend the whole territory they seek to map. That, in fact,
may be the point behind Warren's elaborate narrative structure,
dense with its overlapping frames, its historical data, and its
double-decker commentary. Kroeber notes that romantic narrative
"seems to be the mode toward which an experimenting,
innovating poet, or a poet unsure of his traditions, perhaps even
in rebellion against specialized literary conventions, will naturally
turn ...." 14 That collection of attitudes towards tradition
(experimentation, innovation, uncertainty, rebellion) may be the
inevitable modern gloss upon the frustrations apparent in what
we have in the way of a canon of romantic novels.
World Enough and Time shows us how the sanity, or wholeness,
of Jeremiah Beaumont is torn apart by trying to live through the
premises of both traditions at once. His effort to take both to the
limit exhausts their pretensions to the absolute reference points,
Self and Reality, to which they aspire. Hence Jeremiah finds only
an opposition between an awesome blankness of the self (or
Nature) and the confusing, often conflicting conventional
perspectives with which the culture socializes its members. The
reference points are cultural rather than metaphysical or natural,
and hence are subject to the conceptual limitations of their
underlying assumptions. We have looked closely at the passages
in which Jeremiah, like Colonel Fort, discovers the final blankness
of the self, and a similar emptiness characterizes the wilderness
life on the island of the Grand Bosse. The pure beacon of romantic
selfhood flickers down to an unreachable glimmer; the wilderness
induces a bestial, nonhuman existence; and society's exemplarColonel Fort- turns out to be as morally ambiguous as the
political issues and processes of the day. Jeremiah can neither
escape into selfhood nor merge with society; neither romanticism
nor realism in their pure forms can suffice.
We might conclude, then, that in the ruin of certain
assumptions about realist objectivity and romantic selfhood,
World Enough and Time manages a form of the romantic novel in
which we can see critically a cultural symbiosis of alternative
60
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"explanations." Selfhood, the putative referent of that explanatory
symbiosis, turns out instead to be its "gratuitous" product. Rather
than simply repeating the contradictions inherent in the
traditional form of this subgenre, World Enough and Time thus
identifies the points at which two central attitudes of our culture
overreach themselves in their efforts to establish a sense of
selfhood on the grounds either of transcendental romanticism or
social realism. The inability of either narrator to achieve the kind
of "truth" to which he aspires is not therefore a personal failure to
reconcile these conflicting conventions, but rather the necessary
shortcoming of the conventions themselves, mystified by their
~espective philosophical naivete. World Enough and Time seems to
brirlg its reader to the very brink of a post-metaphysical vision of
selfhood, but a vision that is unfortunately beyond the ability of
either of its narrators to conceive. Jeremiah discovers that neither
he, his "garden" in the wilderness, nor the society that begins to
emerge on the frontier can function as pure ideals. The historian's
efforts to wrest from documents a true order of things or of
persons meets an equally final frustration, for his commitment to
realism is not enough to enable that method to make the great
leap from discourse to Truth. It may well be, then, that in
pointing out that the romantic novel was always an impossible
dream, World Enough and Time emphasizes the spatia-temporal
limitations implicit in its title for both that genre and the culture
that continues to depend upon its dual strategies for creating
meaning, whether separately or, as in the subgenre, in uneasy
tandem. It is too much to call World Enough and Time a novel to
end all novels, but it seems to mark at least the fictive starting
point of its own and, perhaps, of all cultural discourse.
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on dream and drama in The Achievement of Robert Penn Warren (Baton
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9
ln fact, the novel has been criticized precisely because it allows
perspectives to "corrode rather than correct," as Leonard Casper puts it
in his Robert Penn Warren : The Dark and Bloody Ground (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1960), 148. See too Charles R. Anderson's
impatience with "unresolved ambiguities" in the essay cited previously.
Perhaps Harry Modean Campbell most clearly reflects the philosophical
premises of this criticism by calling the book "contradictory" rather than
"paradoxical," and suggesting that the latter is the province of theology
-"for only theologians can successfully claim the dignity of paradox for
the contradictions in their speculations" ("Warren as Philosopher in World
Enough and Time," in Southern Renascence).
'°For a comparison of the novel and Warren's actual sources, see James
H . Justus, "Warren's World Enough and Time and Beauchamp's Confession,"
American Literature 33 (1961-62), 500-511.
"Quotations come from the Vintage Books edition of World Enough and
Time (1979) and will be noted parenthetically. The novel was first
published by Random House in 1950.
12
Most attention to these critical relations has focused upon
romanticism. See, for example, James H . Justus's characterization of the
novel as "a study in the pathology of romanticism," or Frederick P. W.
McDowell's study of "The Romantic Tragedy of Self in World Enough and
Time" (reprinted in the Longley collection), both of which view Jeremiah
as a critique of romantic excess. Justus gives some attention as well to the
"elusiveness of 'truth' in any of our accounts of the past" and to "the
overwhelming complexity and difficulty of self-definition," but in the
context of a critique more of "conventional scientific historiography" than
of the whole realist framework of which that method is one
manifestation.
13
Karl Kroeber, Romantic Narrative Art (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1966), 190.
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